Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Quartararo, Michael (1995-08-03) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
NYS Supreme Court Decisions in Article 78 
Proceedings Court Litigation Documents 
September 2021 
Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Quartararo, Michael 
(1995-08-03) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd 
Recommended Citation 
"Decision in CPLR Article 78 proceedings - Quartararo, Michael (1995-08-03)" (2021). Parole Information 
Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/pdd/282 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYS Supreme Court 
Decisions in Article 78 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
r''. 
' 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF NEW YORK: IAS PART 39 
------------------------------------------x 




For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, 
- against -
THE NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF 
PAROLE, RAUL RUSSI, Chairman, 
Respondent. 
------------------------------------------x 
KRISTIN BOOTH GLEN, J .·: 
Index No. 45734/92 
On February 11, 1992 petitioner was denied parole after a 
hearing which he subsequently challenged in this court by way of _an 
Article 78 proceeding. In a decision dated January 31, 1994, I 
granted his petition and remanded to the Parole Board for a de novo 
consideration, finding that: 
... the Board misconstrued its role and 
prejudged this parole application and 
therefore its determination to deny parole 
must be set aside and a de novo hearing held. 
In addition to the "misconstruing of its role" which was the 
basis for the reversal, I also considered several issues raised by 
petitioner concerning materials allegedly improperly considered by 
the Board. I carefully reviewed and wrote about each of the 




I specifically held that the Board could not consider the 
confession of Peter Quartararo, petitioner's brother, which had 
been found unconstitutionally and illegally obtained, Quartararo v 
Montello, 715 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) aff'd 888 F 2d 126 (2:nld 
Cir. 1989) . 1 A subsequent decision of our Court of Appeals, People 
v Brenesic, 70 NY2d 910 (1987) found that Peter Quartararo's 
confession was not only unconstitutionally obtained but also 
unreliable as a matter of law. 2 
In addition to the confession itself, I also considered that 
the Parole Board had relied upon the fact of petiti~ner's first 
conviction. Since this conviction had been overturned on 
constitutional grounds because of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel, I held: 
1 The District Court took note of the fact that the 
Temporary Commission of Investigation of the State of New York, in 
its investigation of the practices of the Suffolk County District 
Attorney's Office and Police Department found that the Suffolk 
County police deliberately violated the United States Constitution 
and New York laws and that their behavior was "characteristic of 
conduct long tolerated by responsible officials of the Suffolk 
County Police Department and the District Attorney's Office." 
715 F. Supp. at 456. See also, Report of the Temporary Commission 
on Investigation of the State of New York, dated April, 1989. 
2 This was an appeal by one of the co-defendants, who was 
tried separately from the petitioner and Peter. The other co-
defendant, Thomas Ryan also had his conviction reversed based on 
the illegally obtained and unreliable confession of Peter 
Quartararo. People v Ryan, 134 AD2d 300 (2nd Dept. 1987). 
2 
( 
The contents of an unreliable confession .and 
the outcome of a trial so defective that the 
conviction was reversed on ineffective 
assistance of counsel grounds, have no place 
in a Parole Board hearing and determination. 
Third, I noticed that there was some evidence that the Parole 
Board members impropeir-ly relied upon press accounts in their review 
of petitioner's application. This was a notorious crime, and 
continues to arouse strong feelings, even so many years after its 
occurrence. In accordance with such cases as People ex rel Howlind 
v Henderson, 54 AD2d 614 (4th Dept. 1976) and Brennan v Cunningham, 
813 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987) I specifically held that: 
The Parole Board shall not weigh or even 
mention press reports or their contents in a 
hearing de novo or in any future hearings. 
I next considered.petitioner's allegations that the Board had 
improperly considered the revocation of his participation in work 
release. In an in camera examination of the parole file I found 
documents relating to investigation of allegations made against 
petitioner which resulted in the revocation, although petitioner 
was never given an opportunity to rebut the allegations, or any 
other due process in relation to the Department of Correctional 
Services' revocation. Nevertheless it seemed clear that the board 
had relied upon these completely unchallenged ex parte allegations. 
Accordingly, I ordered that: 
all documentation concerning the work 
release revocation investigation be removed 
3 
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from the parole file, unless in the interim, 
petitioner has had notice of the basis for the 
revocation, and the opportunity for a hearing 
or review of the determination in accordance 
with Correction Law §150 et. seq. and 7 NYCRR 
§1904. 
Finally, I considered the inclusion of photo~raphs of the 
victim which were apparently furnished to the Parole Board by the 
District Attorney of Suffolk County, allegedly in an attempt to 
inflame the Parole Board against the petitioner. 3 I ordered that 
the photographs be removed from the parole file and returned to the 
District Attorney or Supreme Court, Suffolk County, whichever was 
appropriate. The respondent did not appeal my decision, and on 
February 23, 1994, the de novo parole hearing which I had ordered 
was held. 
The February 1994 Hearing 
Although denominated a de novo hearing, no new Inmate status 
Report, required for parole hearings, was prepared or utilized. 
Instead, the contents of the Report which had been prepared for the 
February 1992 hearing was employed. The only changes were the 
typeface and the date at the top of the Report, but in all other 
respects the two Reports were identical. Unfortunately, in many 
other respects, the February 1994 hearing was a replay of that 
3 The inflammatory and gratuitous use of these pictures at 
trial had already been commented upon by a federal court in 
overturning petitioner's conviction. Quartararo v Fogg, supra, 679 





which I had already found improper. This hearing was conducted by 
Parole Commissioners Treen and Tauriello. 
Despite my order that Peter Quartararo's confession not be 
considered, it is clear from a number of facts that the confession 
was prominent in the minds of the two Parole Commissioners. For 
example, petitioner stated in an unrebutted affidavit that .he 
observed Commissioner Treen reading the 1992 transcript, a 
transcript which, as already noted, contained substantial reference 
to Peter Quartararo's confession. Commissioner Treen's affidavit 
here does not deny that she reviewed the 1992 transcript. Instead, 
she claims that she was instructed "not to consider Peter 
Quartararo's suppressed confession and petitioner's first 
conviction which was reversed... press reports of the crime or 
documents concerning a work release revocation investigation." 
Having been specifically told inflammatory, prejudicial, and 
improper i terns upon which the question of parole could not be 
~e_t:erm_~_n~d, it strci~I1_S _c::~eduli_ty_ 'to belie~e that thesE: matters_ were 
not in some way in the mind of Commissioner Treen during the de 
novo hearing. 
More to the point, however, the file contained letters from 
the Suffolk County District Attorney's which specifically discussed 





Peter Quartararo confessed to police and his 
own mother that he and three other youths had 
killed John Pius. Peter Quartararo's detailed 
confession was fully corroborated by evidence 
found at the crime scene and information 
received from independent sources. 
(emphasis added) 
' Patterson went on to comment on the reversal of the 1981 
conviction, stating that it was "not based on any question of 
[petitioner's] guilt," thus demonstrating his unfamiliarity with 
the requirements of Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984) and Judge Korman's comments about the weakness of the case. 
The file also contains a letter from an Assistant District Attorney 
Jones which similarly refers to the suppressed confession and 
asserts, erroneously, that it was fully corroborated by other 
evidence. 
In addition, the file, like all others, contains the minutes 
of petitioner's sentence, see Pen. L. §380.70, see also Exec. L. 
§259-a. At sentencing the District Attorney, over objection, read 
extensively from Peter Quartararo's confession. It is clear that 
references to this suppressed confession appear in at least two 
places, and excerpts from it appear on a third. Neither these 
extensive references to, and excerpts from Peter Quartararo' s 
confession, nor the references in the two Assistant District 
Attorney's letters were redacted from the parole file which was 




my decision and order. 
The transcript of the February hearing indicates that much of 
what occurred was an attempt to have petitioner confess to the 
crime, which he refused to do, based on assertion of his Fifth 
i Amendment privilege4 although he repeatedly expressed sorrow over 
the death of John Pius, and sympathy with the loss suffered by his 
parents. The Board denied parole based on what it characterized as 
his lack of remorse, with his assertions of innocence characterized 
as "intellectualism of the crime." The Board found that such lack 
of remorse and "intellectualism" was "an impression of 
insensitivity on [petitioner's] part, and as such we maintain a 
belief that [his] release at this opportunity is not in the best 
interest of the welfare of the community." 
Because of the delay caused by the various levels of appeal 
from the first parole hearing, petitioner's next regularly 
scheduled parole hearing occurred a month after the de novo 
hearing, on March 23, 1994. 
4 At the time of the hearing, a challenge to petitioner's 
conviction by way of federal habeas corpus was pending. One of 
petitioner's arguments in this proceeding is that this questioning 
and the "punishment" which he alleges flowed from his assertion of 
the privilege violated his constitutional rights, and requires 
reversal of the Parole Board's determinations. Because I have 
decided this proceeding in his favor on other grounds, it is 
neither necessary nor appropriate to reach the constitutional 
issue. 
7 
The March Hearing 
This time the hearing was before Commissioners George King and 
Julian Rhodes. As at the February hearing, the letters containing 
information of Peter Quartararo' s confession, as well as the 
sentencing minutes were in the file presented to and considered by 
those Commissioners. Once again, there is extraneous evidence that 
the confessions were considered during the course of this hearing. 
The minutes contain an undeniable reference to the suppressed 
confession, where Commissioner King asks: 
Do you know of any reason that the co-
defendants would have to implicate you in 
(John Pius's J death? Do you have any bad 
blood was there bad blood or some 
disagreement between you and the co-
defendant's that requires them to implicate 
you in this crime? 
(emphasis added) 
Once again petitioner expressed deep sorrow for the death of John 
Pius stating: 
That was a horrible kind of tragic thing that 
happened, and I'm sorry that it happened ... 
but refused to discuss his "guilt." Parole was again denied, this 
time the basis set forth by the Board was the seriousness of the 
crime and its belief that his refusal to admit to the crime despite 
counseling meant that he had gained no insight into the behavior 
which resulted in his conviction. It wrote: 
Further extensive confinement within a 
structured setting is required to safeguard 
8 
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community protection while you participate in 
extensive counseling to erode the massive wall 
you've placed between your emotions and your 
criminal behavior. 
Violations of the January 1993 Order 
As is clear from this brief recitation of the facts of the de 
' novo and March parole hearings, the Board continued to consider 
and, in the case of the confession, may well have relied upon 
material which I specifically ordered removed from the files. This 
includes not only references to the suppressed confession already 
discussed, but also documents pertaining to the work release issue, 
and "public pressure." 
As to work release documents, despite an initial denial here, 
the State has now conceded that the file contains the following 
documents relating to the petitioner's participation in the work 
release program. 
Application and Denial for Program for April 
1991; Application and Denial of Application 
9/91; Queensborough TRP Memorandum of 
Agreement 1/17/92, Furlough papers dated 
1/24/92, and E-Mail referencing a 2/12/92 
review to the Temporary Release Committee 
(TRC) at Queensborough Correctional Facility 
from Senior Counselor Lester advising of 
petitioner's removal from work release program 
due to the two-year hold imposed by the 
February 1992 Board of Parole decision ( in 
accord with statutory requirements) 5 
5 Despite an earlier claim that the law required work 
release to be revoked upon denial of parole, it is now conceded 
(continued ... ) 
9 
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My order required that no information about removal from work 
release be contained in the file unless and until petitioner was 
given notice and a hearing or similar due process. The state 
initially claimed that petitioner had been given such notice by 
virtue of a FeBruary 27, 1992 memo from the Director of Temporary 
Release Programs which simply affirmed the revocation. The second 
document which the State claims provided notice was a June 15, 1993 
letter to the petitioner from Department of Correctional Services 
Deputy Commissioner Coombe, indicating that removal from the work 
release program occurred because petitioner was denied parole. As 
alre~dy noted, this is an incorrect statement of the law. 
In addition, this document, the only one received by the 
petitioner, (except by virtue of submission of the first document 
to court and, therefore presumably made available to petitioner 
through his attorneys) is dated almost a year and a half after 
petitioner's work release was revoked and affirmed. This can 
5
( ••• continued) 
that removal from the work release program is not automatic due to 
a two year parole hold. In Volpis v Department of Correction, 154 
Misc 2d 625 (Sup. ct. Kings Co. 1992) the court interpreted NYCL 
§851, holding that when an inmate currently participating in a 
temporary release program is denied parole the inmate cannot 
automatically become ineligible for temporary release because of 
the parole denial. Rather, the Department is required to review 
the inmate's status to determine if continued participation is 
appropriate. The court additionally noted that the statute 
indicates that the concept of "Temporary Release Program" is 
separate and unrelated to parole denial. 
10 
I 
hardly be considered notice, nor, in any way, satisfy even minimal 
requirements of due process. The inclusion of such documents 
therefore also clearly violates my order. 
Finally, petitioner claims that the February de novo hearing 
was affected by public pressure in the form~ letters from the 
public. Despite denial by the respondent in its Verified Answer, 
the hearing transcript reveals that the Commissioners were familiar 
with these letters. 6 Thus, although no specific press accounts 
have been found in the file, it appears that letters other than 
those specifically permitted under the statute, reflecting the 
public pressure against which my pri?r opinion warned, were before 
the Board and considered by them. 
It is clear that not once, but twice after my decision and 
order, the Board irnperrnissibly considered a number of highly 
prejudicial and unlawful i terns in denying petitioner parole in 
February and March of 1994. This impermissible consideration and 
6 Commissioner Treen stated: 
... obviously this is a very heavy folder. 
There are letters in here from people who have 
come in contact with you both from the 
community for employment and corrections, 
people I guess you and/ or your family have 
reached out to. And of course there are 
letters talking about other aspects of Michael 




violation of the prior order would clearly call for relief, but the 
respondent has interposed a number of technical and procedural 
objections which must be dealt with before proceeding to the 
merits. 
'\ PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
In June 1994, petitioner, appearing prose brought a motion to 
hold the respondents in contempt for their alleged failure to 
comply with my January 1994 order. In the alternative, petitioner 
moved for an order granting release on parole. Respondent opposed 
the contempt motion on several grounds, including lack of personal 
jurisdiction. In an order dated August 30, 1994, I granted 
respondent's motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding. Pursuant 
to CPLR 103, I converted the motion to an Article 78 petition 
challenging the parole determination made after the February 1994 
de novo hearing. 
In its answer to the motion, and to the newly denominated 
Article 78 petition, respondent mentioned, in passing, that venue 
was improper, but made no motion for a change of venue. In 
addition, respondent originally challenged the Article 78 
proceeding as moot, because of the new hearing held in March of 
1994. 7 At the time of conversion to the Article 78 proceeding, 
7 Because the generally appropriate disposition in an 
Article 78 challenge to parole hearing is rehearing, see, e.g., 
(continued ... ) 
12 
the Parole Board's March determination was not final, so the 
conversion order could not include an Article 78 challenge to that 
decision. However by March 20, 1995, all administrative remedies 
for the :March parole denial were exhausted. Petitioner, now 
represented by a clinic at Fordha)n Law School, moved to have an 
Article 78 challenge to the March 1994 hearing consolidated in this 
proceeding. That motion was granted without objection, but with 
respondent reserving its exception to venue, discussed infra. 
Any question of exhaustion of administrative remedies is no 
longer in this case. The only possible impediment to my 
consideration of the Board's actions in both the February and March 
1994 hearings is respondent's belated claim that there is no venue 
New York County. It is to this cla.im which we must next, albeit 
briefly, turn. 
Respondent argues that this proceeding can only be heard in 
Albany County and that it ·has been improperly venued in New York 
County. Respondent relies upon CPLR §78.04(b} which refers to the 
7
( ••• continued} 
Matter of Morgan v Board, 198 AD2d 836 (4th Dept. 1993} Matter of 
Kenny v Division, 198 AD2d 423, 435, (1st Dept. 1993} a successful 
resolution of the petition would simply require a new hearing. 
Since he received an additional release hearing in March, the 
respondent argued that any challenge to his February hearing was 
moot, because the result of the February hearing was no longer that 
which held petitioner in the 'correctional system. See, Matter of 
James v Lussi, AD2d 621 NYS 2d 894 (2nd Dept. 1995}. 
13 
/ 
venue provisions of CPLR §506 (b). The latter provides that when an 
action is brought against a body or officer it must be venued as 
follows: 
A proceeding against a body or officer shall 
be commenced in any county within the judicial 
district where the respondent made the 
determination complained of... or where the 
material events otherwise took place, or where 
the principal office of the respondent is 
located ... 
The decision complained of occurred at Walkill Correctional 
Facility in Ulster County, the final determination occurred in 
Albany County where the Parole Board's principal office is located 
and Albany County is also an appropriate venue under the "principal 
office" provision of the statute. 
This, however, does not end the inquiry. Article 5 of the 
CPLR contains procedures by which improper venue must be 
challenged. Rule 511 provides for the service of a demand for 
change of venue on the ground that the county designated is not a 
proper county, CPLR §5ll(a). That demand must be served with the 
answer, or prior to service of the answer. If the party who has 
improperly venued the action or proceeding does not respond within 
five days after such service, the party seeking change of venue 
must move for change of venue within 15 days of service of the 
demand. 
mandatory. 
Compliance with this demand and motion procedure is 





If a timely statutory demand for change of venue pursuant to 
CPLR §511(a) is not made, the party seeking a change of venue is 
" ... foreclosed from obtaining a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 
§504 and the issue us committed to the court's discretion." 
Losicco v Gardner's Village Inc., 97 AD2d 535, 536 (2nd Dept. 
1983). 
1993) 
Cf. Morales v City of New York, 189 AD2d 581 (1st Dept. 
(because motion was timely made, although undecided, 
subsequent discretionary motion can be decided in favor of change 
of venue.) 
In the instant case, no statutory demand was ever made. The 
petitioner's motion to hold respondent in contempt was converted to 
an Article 78 proceeding by Order dated August 30th, 1994. On 
October 12, 1994, respondent filed a Verified Answer. Referring to 
the February, 1994 hearing, the answer states that petition is 
improperly venued in New York County, but makes no demand for a 
change of venue. 9 Nor, to this date, has any motion for change of 
8 The Appellate Division, First Department, like the other 
departments, has "declined to construe [the] statutory time 
requirement [or demand a change of venue based on the designation 
of an improper county] as merely discretionary." Pittman v Maher, 
202 AD2d 172, {1st Dept. 1994). 
9 The venue issue was "mentioned" once before. In its June 
23, 1994 Notice of Cross Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit in 
Support of Respondent's motion included the comment that 
"petitioner must proceed in the proper venue ... " but neither 
(continued ... ) 
15 
venue been made. 10 
As a technical matter, therefore, the question of improper 
venue is not before me. However, as a practical matter, this issue 
was raised during the oral arguments held before me, and, I 
believe, is properly disposed of here. 
At best, were there an actual motion before me, the 
determination as to whether venue should be removed from New York 
county would be discretionary because of the failure to serve a 
§511 demand. I exercise my discretion to deny any change of venue 
for the following reasons: 
1. This court has had jurisdict~on over petitioner's 
problems with the Parole Board since at least 1993. Respondent 
appeared at all times on the Article 78 proceeding challenging 
9
( ••• continued) 
stated where proper venue lay nor made any demand for change of 
venue. 
10 It is clear that even if a case or proceeding is 
improperly venued, there is no lack of jurisdiction in a Supreme 
Court which renders a decision in that case or proceeding. See, 
e.g., McLaughlin Practice Commentaries, see 509:1 7(b) McKinney's 
CPLR p 69 (1976) D. Siegel, New York Practice (2nd Ed. 183 1991). 
As Professor Siegel states, in an Article 78 proceeding: 
A failure to object to proper venue is a 
waiver of the objection, citing HVAC and 
Sprinkler Contractors Ass'n Inc. v state Univ. 
Constr. Fund, 80 Misc 2d 1047 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
co. 1975) the ensuing judgment on the merits 
is valid." Siegel, supra at p 886. 
16 
petitioner's February, 1992 parole hearing. No objection to venue 
in New York County was ever made, and this court rendered a lengthy 
decision, supra, with specific instructions to the Parole Board. 
No indication that the case was improperly venued was made at that 
time or ae any time thereafter until June of 1994. Respondent is, 
thus, at the very least, guilty of laches. 
2. The interests of conservation of judicial time are served 
by retaining venue in New York County. I am fully familiar with 
the facts of this case, having reviewed the Parole Board records in 
camera, and having heard a number of oral arguments on the instant 
petition, as well, of course, as on the prior _petition. To 
transfer this case to another county and another judge would result 
in an enormous waste of judicial resources. 
.. --
3. The issue of convenience of the parties also clearly 
weighs toward leaving venue in New York county. The respondent, 
although it has its principal office in Albany, has an office in 
New York, and has been represented throughout this proceeding by an 
Assistant Attorney General located in New York County. 
Since June of 1994 the petitioner has been represented by 
Lincoln Square Legal Services, Inc., a clinic run in conjunction 
with Fordham University School of Law located in New York county. 
In its Memorandum in Support of Petition dated April 24, 1995, the 




County, it may no longer be able to represent the petitioner, and 
even if representation is continued, the lack of resources for 
travel, etc., would make such representation extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. 
The clinic has done an extraordin~y job in representing 
petitioner thus far; 11 its fine representation is an aid not only 
to its client but also to the court. The potential deprivation of 
counsel which would result from changing venue clearly militates 
against such change, and in favor of retention in New York County. 
For all of the above reasons I exercise my discretion, to the 
extent that the issue is even before me, to retain jurisdiction and 
to decide this Article 78 proceeding. 
REMEDY 
Ordinarily, the appropriate remedy upon annulment of the 
Parole Board's action would be, as in my prior order, to remand for 
a rehearing in accordance with the specific provisions, if any, of 
the court's order. On the unique facts of this case, however, a 
different remedy is required. 
I begin by noting that the petitioner has met all of the 
11 Clinical Professor James Cohen and his students Matthew 
Cushing, Milind Parekh, Sarena Straus and Sarah Watson are to be 
commended for the quality of their work and the high degree of 
professionalism they have demonstrated. 
18 
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statutory requirements to demonstrate that if released, he can 
"live and remain at liberty without violating the law" Exec. L. 
259-i(c) (1) and that his release is compatible with the welfare of 
society, Exec. L. 259-i(c) (2). 
) First, as described in my prior opinion, in 1988 petitioner 






no basis for finding that 
poses a danger to the public if 
Quartararo v Fogg, #86-cv-2337 
(unpublished order, dated 
Indeed, following his release on bail pending a new trial, 
petitioner distinguished himself as a model citizen. He worked, 
sometimes at two jobs, attended college, met and married his wife 
·Patricia. He became involved in community affairs such as the 
·-
loca l Parent Teachers Association, and helped raise and support his 
wife's two school-aged children. He had no conflicts with the law 
during this period, and he made all scheduled court appearances. 
Second, even after petitioner was returned to prison in 1990, 
he continued on a path of positive growth, graduating with honors 
from the State University of New York at New Paltz, continuing his 
model behavior, and participating in numerous other programs in 
prison. 
In October 1991, after review by no less than six ranking 
correctional professionals, petitioner was approved for the DOCS 
19 
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Temporary Release Program. Initially, he left an upstate prison on 
two unescorted seven-day furloughs for the Thanksgiving and 
Christmas holidays. In January 1992, petitioner was transferred to 
work release. He immediately secured employment as an 
administrative assistant in 'a manufacturing firm. Petitioner 
obeyed all rules and regulations, made all required reports, and 
continued his model behavior. 
Third, the record contains three psychological reports. All 
portray petitioner as a thoroughly self-managing young man without 
mental illness, without thought disorder, clear thinking and 
reality oriented, a~d perhaps most significantly, not suicidal or 
homicidal or a danger to himself or others. And, finally, as 
discussed at length in my prior decision petitioner's institutional 
record is exemplary. 
Nor can the third requirement of the "reasonable probability" 
standard of Exec. L. 251-i(c), that the defendant's release "will 
serve to deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine 
respect for the law" Exec. L. 259-i(c) (3) make petitioner 
ineligible for parole. The seriousness of the crime is not basis 
by itself, for denying parole. E.g., Matter of King v Division of 
Parole, 190 AD2d 423 (1st Dept. 1993) aff'd 83 NY2d 788 (1994). 
The King case is illustrative. There the defendant was 
convicted of murder, manslaughter in the second degree, attempted 
20 
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robbery in the first degree, assault first degree and possession of 
a dangerous weapon. The charges arose out of the shooting death of 
an off duty police officer during the robbery of a fast food 
restaurant by two men. Despite the seriousness of the crime, and 
the importance of impressing upon the public the titter 
impermissibility of assaulting or, worse, killing a police officer, 
the First Department in King noted that the petitioner's 
extraordinary rehabilitative achievements " ... would appear to 
strongly militate in favor of granting parole" and found " ... it 
difficult to believe that petitioner would be denied parole after 
a hearing at which the statutory factors are fair~y and properly 
applied." Id. at 532-34. 
As in King, the crime for which petitioner was convicted is a 
most serious one. It is, however, difficult to conclude that this 
single event which occurred more than sixteen years ago, when the 
petitioner was fourteen years of age, could be the sole basis for 
the Parole Board's denial of parole on any of the three statutory 
grounds, particularly in light of the events which have transpired 
during the decade and a half since the crime occurred. Like 
the Appellate Division in King, I find it almost impossible to 
believe that a parole hearing in which the statutory factors were 
fairly and properly applied could result in anything other than the 
petitioner's release on parole, yet this is what has happened not 
21 
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happened not once, but on three separate occasions. Accordingly, 
I find that the only appropriate relief left to this court is a 
direction to the respondent to release the petitioner to parole 
supervision. 
Respondent h'as demonstrated the petitioner will never receive 
a fair parole hearing. On three separate occasions respondent has 
shown that it cannot or will not follow its own regulations, 
statutory mandate, or the lawful order of this court. Each of 
petitioner's hearings has been tainted by improper and prejudicial 
information, including that which I specifically ordered respondent 
not to consider. The Board has failed to support any of its 
determinations by adequate evidence, has misconstrued its role, 
power and duty, prejudged each of petitioner's parole applications, 
and applied the wrong legal standard. For all of these reasons, 
and because it is difficult if not impossible to believe that each 
of the nineteen State Parole Commissioners has not formed an 
opinion or been tainted in some way by the improprieties in this 
case, the only appropriate relief is an order directing release. 
CPLR §7806 provides that in a proceeding to review an agency 
determination, "the judgment may grant petitioner the relief to 
which he is entitled ... and may direct or prohibit specified action 
by the respondent. 11 The court's remedial powers under 7806 are 
bi::-oad, and include the power to direct respondent to release 
22 
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petitioner on parole. In at least one other remarkably similar 
case, the court ordered a parole applicant released on parole after 
several hearings at which the Board ignored court orders and 
refused to adhere to appellate court rulings. People ex rel 
Schaurer v Smith, 81 Misc 2d 1039 (Sup. Ct. Wyo.'lco. 1975) . 12 The 
court imposed this drastic remedy on the basis of its finding that 
"it is absolutely useless to send this inmate back [to the Board] 
for a new hearing" id. at p 1043. It would similarly be 
"useless"13 to remand this case for a fourth hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above reasons, the Parole Board's 
determinations of February and March 1994 are annulled, and the 
Board is directed to release petitioner to parole supervision. 
This constitutes the decision and judgment of the court. 
DATED: AUGUST 0 1995 ~ 
Kristi~Booth Glen 
12 
13 Ordering yet another de novo hearing, which respondent 
suggests is the only available remedy, would result in petitioner 
being placed on an absurd procedural merry go round in which 
respondent would be free to make the same irrational and 
unsupported determination while the court stands powerless to do 
anything except send the case around for another "spin." This 
scenario would not only result in a complete waste of judicial and 
__ administrative resources, but, more seriou!:5_lY_; a total deprivation 
of petitioner's right to a fair hearing which, if provided w6µld 
surely result in his release. F 1 L E 
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